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The diversity of views held by Russia's Muslims on the 11 September attack and the 
subsequent US-led anti-terrorist operation defy convenient classification. First, there 
have been contradictory responses from Muslim leaders of differing political and 
religious leanings. The dividing line runs mainly between the official muftis and the 
unofficial leaders. Second, the views expressed by Russia's Muslims may well change 
substantially in response to new developments in Afghanistan or other potential theaters 
of the anti-terrorist operation. Finally, in Russia the US effort is viewed through the prism 
of the Chechen war. The anti-terrorist language, in the Russian context, is deeply 
reminiscent of the rhetoric at the start of the Chechen war. In this way the response to 
the US effort partially reflects preexisting views of the war in Chechnya. Hence, it is not 
possible to speak of a dominant attitude among Russia's Muslims and, at this juncture, 
any appraisal must bear a somewhat preliminary and fragmentary character.
The reaction to the strikes against the Taliban among the Russian population, including 
the Muslims, is contradictory. On the one hand, the habits of suspicion garnered over 50 
years of Cold War confrontation die hard and many Russians are inclined to view the 
US as a foe threatening Russia's vital interests. On the other hand, it seems that these 
attitudes are changing in response to the events of 11 September, a genuine watershed 
which proved the global nature of the terrorist threat.
President Vladimir Putin was the first to react, and he did so firmly, saying that terrorists 
have thrown down a challenge to the world. One has the feeling that he immediately 
sensed that the opportunity to effect a serious reassessment by the US and the West of 
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his own "antiterrorist" operation in Chechnya. His remarks also set the tone for many 
who spoke after him.
On 12 September, the mufti of Dagestan, Akhmad-Khadzhi Abdulaev, publicly 
expressed his condolences: "Of course one more statement, coming from anyone, can't 
bring back the victims or lessen the tragedy and grief that cover the globe. However, let 
my words and with them the words of all Dagestanis be not flowery but deep and 
sincere sympathies, which represent the tears and pain of thousands of my 
countrymen."(2)
The Dagestani mufti pointed out that terrorism contradicts Muslim religious values. "I 
think there is no need to yet again assure everyone that terrorism cannot be combined 
with Islam. On the contrary, he who committed this can not be regarded as 'human.'... 
The footage from Palestine that has been broadcast throughout the world should not be 
taken as incriminating all Muslim believers.... Just as the handful of Nazis celebrating in 
front of the US embassy [in Moscow] should not be taken as representative [of the 
Russian people]."
The mufti reminded the audience that in August-September 1999 Dagestan itself had 
been attacked by North Caucasian fundamentalists, known as Wahhabis: (3) "We 
certainly know about terrorism first hand. Only a few days ago we marked the 
anniversaries of the incursion of the terrorist grouping into our republic and of the 
explosions of Buinaksk,(4) and the terrorist attack that carried away the life of 
Dagestan's mufti S. Abubakarov."(5)
The other leading Muslims, Ravil' Gainudin, the chairman of the Coordinating Council of 
the Muftis of Russia, and Talgat Tadzhuddin, the head of the Central Directorate of 
Russia's Muslims, also condemned the 11 September attacks and approved of the US 
military response (albeit with some minor caveats).(6)
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Among the important muftis, the only one to condemn the anti-terrorist actions was 
sheik Nafigulla Ashirov, the chairman of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of the Asian 
part of Russia (DUMAR).(7) At a 5 November press conference, "Will Russia's Muslims 
fight in Afghanistan?," he accused the US and other Western nations of unraveling a 
war against the Muslim world. According to Ashirov, "In Afghanistan the [powers] 
including Russia are carrying out a crusade against Islam." Ashirov called on the 
audience to take a "differentiated" attitude to Osama bin Laden's statements. The mufti 
characterized the Taliban as "humane" and approved of their demolition of the statues of 
the Bimiyan Buddahs.(8) Moreover, he said, "every Muslim has the right to fight on 
behalf of the defenders of the Afghan state," meaning the Taliban.(9)
Among the political activists, Abdul-Vakhid Niyazov, perhaps the most visible Muslim 
political leader, came forth with biting criticism of the US anti-terrorist actions. Niyazov is 
a member of the Duma and the chairman of the political council of the Eurasia party, 
which relies heavily on Muslim members. In an interview with the weekly, Versia, 
Niyazov said, "We protest against the barbaric operation of the USA, which hits first at 
the Afghans, not at the terrorists. It's clear that the US is pursuing goals far flung from 
the struggle against terrorism. The Afghan war affects Russia much more than is being 
said. I can see how inter-ethnic relations became substantially worse as in the case of 
the Tsaritsin pogrom.(10) Our press, unfortunately, only adds fuel to the fire and fuels 
xenophobic attitudes. But the US brushes off this wave of aggression towards people 
from a different civilization."(11)
Similarly it is significant that a moderate (at least until recently) Muslim political leader, 
Abdurashid Saidov, the founder of the Islamic Democratic Party of Dagestan who now 
directs the Committee for Human Rights of the Moscow-based International Islamic 
Representative Organization, gave a very negative assessment. For Muslims who obey 
the Koran and the Sunna,(12) "who fear God and aren't simply Muslims only in their 
passports or last names, the current situation constitutes a reason to declare jihad." He 
seems sincerely convinced that "the main task of the official Muslim clerics in all of 
Russia's regions is to present everything that the Russian government and president 
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does as furthering Islam and Muslims."(13) Hence they find religious justification for 
everything that comes from the government.
"And until there comes a single effort of all Muslims- if not of the whole world, then at 
least of Russia-the West together with Russia will keep talking to the Muslims in the 
language of rockets and artillery," Saidow said. He draws a parallel between the second 
Chechen war and the war against the Taliban. The contrast between Saidov and 
Abdulaev is readily apparent in their opposite invocations of the Chechen war.
"And all of this," Saidov continues, "will be done 'in the interests of Muslims,' and will be 
accompanied by the commentary, 'we're not fighting against Muslims, we're on the 
same side as the Muslims!' as Putin, Bush and others say already."
Another influential commentator, Maxim Shevchenko, the editor of Nezavisimaya 
gazeta's "Religion" supplement, although not a Muslim himself, sympathizes with what 
might be termed the "neformaly" among Russia's Muslims, who challenge the religious-
political establishment. He writes: "The US government is readying a war against 
Islamic Afghanistan. Mankind is asked to choose between the 'civilized' and the 
'uncivilized.' Immediately we find that Palestinians and the Arab world in general are 
among the 'uncivilized.' Faced with a real threat from the US, Muslim religious and 
political leaders overwhelmingly supported the US. But those we may call ordinary 
Muslims, who don't rely on US credits or oil exports, have readied themselves for 
war."(14)
Shevchenko goes on to argue that "after the collapse of socialism, political Islam is the 
biggest and most powerful obstacle to those who would aspire to world domination. One 
should not confuse this movement with Islam 'in general' which is integrated into global 
structures at the level of muftis, kings, presidents and etc."
By "political Islam," scholars usually mean fundamentalism. In Russia, as elsewhere, 
the Sunni Muslims, who constitute the vast majority of Muslims, can be divided into two 
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movements. The traditionalists believe that since the time of the prophet the religion 
developed in an unbroken path, and hence accept the consequences of this growth 
together with its spiritual riches. The fundamentalists, who think that the faith has 
accumulated many mistakes, prefer to return to the original texts: the Koran and the 
Sunna. Today, radical Islamic fundamentalism replaces Marxism as a revolutionary 
force. As one of the main ideologists and the founder of the Islamic Party of Russia's 
Rebirth, Geidar Dzhamal', says, " In the current conditions, when 1% of the population 
of the planet exploits the rest of the world, Islam presents itself not as a religion in the 
traditional or secularist sense, but as an all-encompassing ideology, which protects the 
weak and the oppressed."(15)
Since the Taliban's "emirate" became a kind of model of political Islam, it is hardly 
surprising that the radicals in Russia sympathize with the Taliban. Even though the 
number of such persons seems fairly small, they do form a very vocal minority. The 
majority of Russia's Muslims either approve of or are fairly indifferent to the US actions 
in Afghanistan.
It should also be clear that a person's response to the war in Afghanistan is colored 
heavily by perceptions of the war in Chechnya. In reality, if one looks carefully, there are 
very substantial differences between the "anti-terrorist operation" in Chechnya and the 
"anti-terrorist operation" in Afghanistan. However, many cannot see these differences 
because Russian government propaganda has succeeded in making the two seem 
indistinguishable to the domestic and international media.
On the eve of 11 September, Afghanistan was in the throes of civil war between the 
traditionalist Muslims of the North and the totalitarian regime of the south. It's hardly a 
coincidence that the legendary leader of the Northern Alliance, Akhmed Shah Mas'ud, 
was assassinated, apparently by Al Qaeda, only a few days earlier. At this writing, it 
looks like the Northern Alliance, thanks to air support from US and the UK, is 
successfully squeezing the Taliban out of the country. The Taliban regime is melting 
before our eyes, since it has lost all support of the population.
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In contrast, Chechnya suffers a deep ethnic conflict: A large proportion of the population 
seeks to establish sovereignty in the context of an independent state. This conflict is 
properly understood as a national movement for independence. Radical 
fundamentalism has a presence in this conflict, but its role is rather limited.
Critics of the war in Afghanistan among Russia's Muslims worry that the US may subject 
the population of Afghanistan to the sort of bombardment that the Russian military used 
in Chechnya. Such sentiments seem natural in a media environment which stressed the 
common goals and mutual endorsement of Bush and Putin. However, all such 
judgments are preliminary and can change rapidly as the results of the US-led 
campaign become more apparent.
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